Chapter VI Organizational Reforms
In 2015, Japan spared no effort to put forward its institutional and organizational reforms.
The pivotal point of the reforms is strengthening the systems of military decision-making command, operation and command, intelligence and communications, logistic support and foreign co-operations, which sustain the Abe administration’s “new military buildup programme”. Based on this, Japan went on with the organizational adjustment by focusing on gearing up overall reforms of the Defense Ministry and integrating the Joint Staff Office and the command systems of the forces for the purpose of enhancing the planning and execution capabilities of military policies, of elevating the status and authority of professional servicemen, and of improving decision-making efficiency. Meanwhile, guided the principle of enhancing “southwestern defense” and containing the so-called “China threat”, JSDF proceeded with the adjustments of the organization of the forces concerned so as to reinforce the forward deployment and improve the capabilities of rapid response and direct engagement.
In 2015, Japan’s main military reforms and adjustments include：
Firstly, centralizing the management of JSDF. According to the amendment to the Act for Establishment of Ministry of Defense approved by the Diet in June, 2015, Japan formally abolished civilian control, which actually eliminated the advantage of civilian officials over uniformed officers, enabled the Joint Staff Office to centralize the command and control of JSDF, and valued professional input from the Joint Staff Office and service staff offices. This meant that the “uniformed officer corps” was about to play a pivotal role in JSDF operations. As a result, the Bureau of Operational Policy was removed, with the task of operational planning being transferred to the Joint Staff Office and that of doctrine-making and training management being handed over to the Bureau of Defense Policy of the Joint Staff Office. Besides, a civilian position of defense review officer, as spokesman for the military, was created, responsible for parliament defense, public statements, policy implementation and collaboration between the concerned ministries and
agencies. The series of reforms further strengthened the power of the Joint Staff Office. As a result, the uniformed officer corps, rather than civilian officials, plays an increasingly dominant role in managing and commanding military operations, which, in essence, weakened the fundamental defense principle of civilian control which Japan had claimed to adhere to. As JSDF military officers played an increasingly influential role in the Abe administration, high-ranking officers o JSDF frequented the Prime Minister’s official residence.
Secondly, optimizing the command and intelligence systems of the front-line units. Japan proactively planned to establish the headquarters of the Ground Central Command through integrating the operational forces of JGSDF and units directly subject to its command to centralize command and control of the ground forces. At present, preparations for establishing the Ground Defense Command have almost been completed. Its headquarters was to be set up at JGSDF Camp Asaka in Tokyo, where the headquarters of the Central Rapid Response Regiment was located. In 2016, the Japanese government will set aside 92 billion yen for the construction of the base and preparation work. In order to enhance maritime operation capability, especially the
collaboration capabilities between the branches of the forces, and to seek command coordination and intelligence sharing between JGSDF, JMSDF, JASDF, the related ministry and agency and the US forces based in Japan, Japan planned to establish “Maritime Operation Center” at Yokosuka base on the basis of the existing headquarters of the self-defense fleet. In addition, Japan sought to change the separate command and intelligence systems by establishing, on the basis of shared data base and network platform, the synchronized command system not only shared by the army, navy and air force, but connected with the US forces in Japan.
Thirdly, establishing Defense Equipment Agency. With the new “three principles for defense equipment transfer” replacing the “three principles for weaponry export”, Japan viewed the establishment of Defense Equipment Agency as one of the most important programmes of system reforms. After long-term consideration and planning, in October, 2015, the Defense Equipment Agency, responsible for procurement, research and development of JSDF weaponry and the export of weapons and equipment of Japan’s military enterprises. With an authorized strength of about 1800 personnel, the Defense Equipment Agency comprised of Secretariat, the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Programme Management, Bureau of Technology and Strategy and Bureau of Adjustment Management, was in charge of about 2 billion yen of procurement budget. The aim of establishing the Defense Equipment Agency was to integrate the related functions of the existing Management Equipment Bureau, Equipment and Facility Office, Technical Research Office and offices of the three offices responsible for equipment management, to improve the efficiency of weapon procurement and research and development, to tap into and release Japan’s defense industrial potential and to promote national strategy.
Fourthly, gearing up reforms of the Defense Ministry and optimizing institutional functions. Apart from reorganizing and integrating of the agencies of the Defense Ministry, enhancing the “unified” command of the forces and establishing the Defense Equipment Agency, Japan established, abolished and combined defense offices, and strengthened the capabilities of policy plan and implementation according to specific requirements. For example, by reorganizing Management Equipment Bureau, Japan created “Equipment Planning Bureau” responsible for the construction of the intelligence network and infrastructure related to the buildup of defense capabilities； added the position of Chief Councilor for Minister, specializing in media affairs to promote propaganda capabilities； planned to set up the position of Global Strategy Planning Officer in the Defense Policy Agency responsible for organizing related panels and making long-term military strategies and conducting policy research on space and cyber warfare, and so on. Meanwhile, Japan adjusted the internal organization of the Defense Research Institute and the Defense College for the purpose of strengthening professional education and research and the offices of policy research and international exchanges.
Fifthly, reorganization and redeployment of the forces to contain the so-called “China threat”.
For the enhancement of the airborne operational capabilities in the “southwestern island” area, Japan transferred the 304 combined it with the 204th Tactical Fighter Squadron of the 8 th Air Division to Okinawa and Air Division by Tactical Fighter Squadron based there to form the 9 th the end of January of 2016. Besides, based at Kyushu Island, Japan established the new “amphibious mobile unit”, built battalions and bases for armored vehicles and “Osprey” transport helicopters （the related budget for 2015 was 179 billion yen）, getting prepared for “towards southwest” combat. At the end of March, 2016, Japan deployed “Coastal Surveillance Unit” and set up radar stations at Yanaguni Island 150kilometers away from Diaoyu Islands. At the end of
2015, JMSDF reorganized the “Oceanographic Command” into “Oceanographic and anti-submarine Command” for the purpose of improving capabilities of anti-submarine detection and analysis. In order to step up the training of special personnel for off-island landing and capture, in September, 2015, Japan decided to have established, by the end of 2016, the “amphibious mobile training squadron” of about 90 personnel, in charge of training of amphibious mobile units.
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