Firstly, the document remains consistent with the Obama administration’s China policy. “The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world.” It has been a consistent statement since President Obama took office, which demonstrates that his perception of China-US relationship does not change.
Secondly, the document expresses the US willingness to enhance mutual cooperation with China to counter common challenges and thus explicitly refutes the argument that China and the US are leading to strategic confrontation. The document points out that “We seek cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” At the same time, the document emphasizes that “While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation.” Moreover, it also mentions the China-US climate change agreement reached in November 2014 and expresses the US appreciation of China’s effort and sincerity in coping with climate change. “As the world’s two largest emitters, the United States and China reached a landmark agreement to take significant action to reduce carbon pollution.”
Thirdly, the document expresses the US major concerns over China and decides to strengthen its surveillance and precaution against China. Those major concerns over China in the document are listed as follows：（1） China’s policy on the disputed territories. “On territorial disputes,particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation. We encourage open channels of dialogue to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. We also support the early conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between China and the Association of Southeast Asian States （ASEAN）.”
Moreover, the document reiterates that “The United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the safety and sustainability of the air and maritime environments.” （2） China’s military modernization. The document maintains that the US “will closely monitor China’s military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation.” （3） China’s democracy andhuman rights. The document claims that the US “will insist that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” （4） Cybersecurity The document stresses that “we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defendour networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government.” As a result, the US will continue and strengthen its surveillance and precaution against China’s actions. “We will manage competition from a position of strength.”
All of the above statements reflect the US ambivalent attitudes towards China’s rise. On one hand, it hopes to take advantage of China’s strength to mitigate and cope with global and regional threats. On the other hand, however, it is concerned that China will challenge its hegemony and interests. In essence, the US anticipates that China will rise as a responsible state in the direction and domains set by the US. This strategic anticipation is, in fact, expressed in President Obama’s first National Security Strategy. It emphasizes that the US will “welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation.”
B. Releasing National Military Strategy and clarifying the adjustment of the US military strategy
On July 1st, 2015, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff （JCS） releases a new version of The National Military Strategy of the United States （NMS）. It identifies strategic threats or rivals and figures out the core military capabilities of the strategic rivals. What is more, it illustrates the US military integrated strategy, provides a task list of military capability building, and analyzes potential challenges in adjusting military strategy. Compared with the 2011 version, the NMS 2015 clearly reveals the shift and balance of the center of gravity of US military strategy. That is to shift from countering violent extremist organizations （VEOs） to coping with challenges from big powers.
a. Identifying strategic threats or rivals
In the chapter entitled “The Strategic Environment” of NMS 2015, the US strategic threats or rivals are identified the same as what General Martin E. Dempsey, then Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff （CJCS）, has summarized in February 2015. Namely, the national security threats faced by the US are 2-2-2-1. Firstly, 2 issues of high magnitude refer to Russia and China. Next, 2 issues ofmoderate magnitude refer to Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea （DPRK）.
Thirdly, 2 issues of network cover violent extremist network （from western Pakistan to North Africa） and cross-border crime network （west hemisphere）. Fourthly, 1 issue of domain is cyberspace security. It is obvious that threats posed by China and Russia are far more severe than those by the VEOs.
The following statement about China is cited from the NMS：“We support China’s rise and encourage it to become a partner for greater international security. However, China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with international law. The international community continues to call on China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces astride vitalinternational sea lanes.” Although the document lists China as the last among those threat-posing countries and displays the US support for China’s rise, it is nothing but a discourse complying with current diplomatic atmosphere, for China is still referred to as a “revisionist state” together with other countries listed by the US.
b. Ascertaining the core military capabilities of the strategic rivals
Unlike NMS 2011, the 2015 version of NMS devotes a chapter to “Military Environment.” With regard to core military capabilities of those challenging rivals, the document attaches importance to two elements：emerging technologies and pattern of conflicts.
Emerging technologies that pose challenges. The document points out that for the past decade, the US forces have been mainly focusing on operations against VEOs. But in the foreseeable future, some state actors will probably have the capability to compete with the US militaryadvantages, even to contest regional freedom of movement and threaten its homeland. Of particular concerns are proliferation of the ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies, unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction （WMD）.
Emerging technologies are impacting the calculus of deterrence and conflict management by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision space. For example, attacks on the communications and sensing systems could occur with little or no warning, affecting US ability to assess, coordinate, communicate, and respond. As a result, future conflicts between states may prove to be unpredictable, costly, and difficult to control. VEOs are taking advantage of emergent technologies as well, using information tools to propagate destructive ideologies and to use improvised explosive devices （IED）, suicide vests, and tailored cyber tools to spread terror while seeking ever more sophisticated capabilities, including WMD. However, technology development of the big powers is posing greater challenges and threats.
State, non-state and hybrid conflicts form a continuum of conflict. The document reveals that the probability of US involvement in interstate war is assessed to be low but growing. Should one occur, however, the consequences would be immense. VEOs, in contrast, pose an immediate threat to trans-regional security. Overlapping state and non-state violence, there exists an area of conflict where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve their objectives.
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